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Abstract. Protecting the location privacy of source and sink nodes in a sensor
network is an important problem. Source-location privacy is to prevent event source
tracking by adversaries and sink-location privacy is to protect sink nodes from
adversaries who try to disrupt the sensor network. In this paper, we propose a
constant-rate broadcast scheme for ensuring their location privacy. This scheme
(1) equalizes traffic patterns of the sensor network to deal with eavesdropping
and (2) minimizes the routing information of each sensor node to deal with node
compromising. We further reduce the overhead of the proposed scheme by proposing
a forwarder-driven broadcast (FdB) scheme that allows efficient multiple broadcasts
with smaller buffer usage. Analysis and evaluation results show that FdB can support
multiple broadcasts with small message delivery time and buffer usage.
Keywords: sensor networks, location privacy, global eavesdropper, compromised
node, information leak.
1. Introduction
Sensor networks are developed for efficient sensing and gathering of data in a large area
such as a city, a habitat, or a battlefield. They consist of a large number of resource-
constrained sensor nodes and a small number of sink nodes (or base stations). Each sensor
node senses events and gathers data in its sensing coverage and it then sends these data to
the sink node via multi-hop wireless communications through the other sensor nodes due
to its limited transmission range and battery capacity.
However, sensor networks suffer from location privacy problems, because adversaries
can estimate the locations of their targets (source and/or sink nodes) by exploiting the
limited capability of sensor nodes and their wireless structure. Furthermore, several re-
searchers show that message encryption is vulnerable to adversaries who estimate source
and destination of messages by eavesdropping and analyzing where wireless traffic is
initiated and terminated [2, 11]. Therefore, we demand a method to prevent the traffic
analysis to ensure location privacy in sensor networks.
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1.1. Related Work
Numerous researchers conduct various studies on location privacy problems of sensor
networks, which can be classified either source-location privacy or sink-location privacy
problems.
Source-location Privacy. The source-location privacy problem is how to conceal a source
of messages from an eavesdropper, which is serious for applications where the location of
an event is important. For example, we consider a sensor network monitoring our troops
and enemy troops in battlefields. When enemy troops can assay the location of our troops
from the wireless signals of the sensor network, they can locate and attack our troops.
We classify the source-location privacy problem as either source-location privacy
against a local eavesdropper or source-location privacy against a global eavesdropper.
The monitoring area of the local eavesdropper is assumed to be the transmission area of
a sensor node whereas that of the global eavesdropper is assumed to be the entire sensor
network.
Several researchers study how to achieve source-location privacy against a local eaves-
dropper [11, 8, 10, 14, 18, 20, 25, 26, 13] and a global eavesdropper [17, 16, 19, 24, 25, 27].
The studies on source-location privacy against a local eavesdropper utilize random delay
injections [8, 10] or randomized routing [11, 14, 18, 20, 25, 26, 13] to disturb an adversary’s
traffic analysis in a local area. The studies on source-location privacy against a global
eavesdropper utilize dummy source nodes that send dummy messages to a sink node at a
constant rate [17, 16]. However, the dummy messages cause much energy consumption and
slow message delivery. Therefore, researchers propose schemes for reducing the energy
consumption, such as using a small number of dummy source nodes [17, 16], using proxy
nodes to filter dummy messages [27], or re-using dummy messages from one-hop neighbor
nodes [19]. Researchers also propose schemes for reducing the message delivery latency,
such as sending messages to the sink at a probabilistic rate [24] or finding optimal paths to
the sink nodes [25, 19].
Sink-location Privacy. The sink-location privacy problem is how to conceal the desti-
nation (a sink node in general) of messages from an eavesdropper, which is important
for a sensor network where survival of the network is important. For example, a sensor
network monitoring battlefields should resist physical attacks to the network. If enemies
can estimate which node is a sink node, they try to destroy the sink node to break down the
entire network.
We classify studies on sink-location privacy into sink-location privacy against a local
eavesdropper [2–5, 9] and sink-location privacy against a global eavesdropper [17]. The
studies on sink-location privacy against a local eavesdropper utilize dummy traffic [2–5, 9]
and randomized routing to disturb the traffic analysis [3, 4, 9]. The study on sink-location
privacy against a global eavesdropper [17] suggests schemes using dummy sink nodes and
backbone flooding. In the scheme using dummy sink nodes, each source node redundantly
sends messages to several dummy and real sink nodes. In the backbone flooding, each
source node sends messages to one of the backbone nodes that flood received messages to
all other backbone nodes. The sink node is a neighbor of a backbone node to overhears
flooding. However, in both schemes, all traffic still meets at either dummy sink nodes or
backbone nodes.
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1.2. Motivation and Research Goal
The lack of studies that (1) solve both source- and sink-location privacy problems simultane-
ously and (2) consider violations of location privacy due to compromised nodes motivates
us to conduct a new study. Although Metha et al. [17] consider both source- and sink-
location problems in their study, they independently discuss the problems. Furthermore,
dealing with compromised nodes is important to assure location privacy, because an adver-
sary can use the routing information leaked by compromised nodes to estimate locations
of other sensor nodes. We demand a scheme that can solve the problems simultaneously
and effectively.
In this paper, we propose a scheme for source- and sink-location privacy against
global eavesdroppers and compromised nodes in sensor networks. The proposed scheme
makes every node to constantly broadcast same-size messages to its neighbors, which are
either real or dummy messages. Only real messages are delivered to every sensor node
whereas dummy messages are discarded in a one-hop area. This constant-rate broadcast
can eliminate traffic correlations and traffic concentration points from sensor networks
while minimizing routing information at each node, because no path from a source node
to a sink node is maintained. Therefore, we can guarantee location privacy against global
eavesdroppers and routing information leaked by compromised nodes.
We also propose a forwarder-driven broadcast (FdB) scheme for reducing the large
transmission overhead of message flooding especially when several source nodes simultane-
ously broadcast real messages. FdB support efficient multiple broadcasts while minimizing
buffer usage of each sensor node. We show the efficiency of FdB over the simple flooding
and the multipoint relaying (MPR)-based broadcast [21] by mathematical analyses and
simulation.
We summarize the main contributions of this paper as follows:
– We propose a scheme for assuring both source-location and sink-location privacy
against global eavesdroppers and leaked information from compromised nodes in
sensor networks for the first time. All previous work only considers a subset of these
problems.
– We propose a forwarder-driven broadcast (FdB) scheme that can decrease the message
delivery time and each node’s buffer usage for simultaneous constant-rate broadcasts.
– We perform both mathematical analyses and simulations to verify the performance of
the proposed scheme.
1.3. Paper Organization
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses models and problems. Section 3
introduces the proposed scheme. Section 4 evaluates the proposed scheme. Lastly, Section 5
concludes this paper.
2. Models and Problems
2.1. Network Model
We assume a mission-critical sensor network requiring higher security and minimum
response time rather than a long lifetime (e.g., a sensor network to monitor battlefields).
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This sensor network consists of several homogeneous sensor nodes and a single sink node
and its sensing field consists of several square cells having randomly deployed sensor
nodes, as described in previous work [13, 24, 27]. When two or more nodes locate in the
same cell, one of them is activated and others are deactivated. Each cell has an identifier
representing its location but only the sink node can match the identifier with its real location.
Each sensor node in a cell can directly send messages to its eight one-hop neighboring
cells.
To avoid revealing the entire network topology from compromised nodes, only the
sink node maintains information about the entire network topology. Each sensor node
only keeps information about its one-hop and two-hop neighboring cells by exchanging
information about one-hop neighbors with its one-hop neighbors as in a multi-point relay
(MPR)-based scheme [21].
Each sensor node has (1) an individual key shared with the sink node, (2) pair-wise
shared keys shared with each of its one-hop neighbors, respectively, and (3) a one-hop
cluster key shared with all of its one-hop neighbors. A cluster consists of a node and its
one-hop neighbor nodes. When the cluster consists of N nodes, each node of the cluster
has N − 1 pair-wise shared keys and a one-hop cluster key. We assume that previous key
management schemes [7, 15, 29, 28, 1] are used to manage these keys.
2.2. Attack Model
The main objectives of an adversary are locating event sources or destroying a sensor
network. We assume the adversary has two attack methods: global eavesdropping and node
compromising to locate source or sink nodes. A global eavesdropper can eavesdrop on all
traffic in the entire sensor network area using a powerful device that can capture all wireless
signals in a large area or deploying several sensor nodes to the target area to monitor
traffic [25, 30]. In general sensor networks, source nodes exhibit higher transmission rates
than other nodes. Furthermore, almost all traffic goes to the sink. The global eavesdropper
can easily locate source and sink nodes by analyzing traffic patterns.
We also assume that although an adversary can compromise sensor nodes, remote
attestation schemes [23, 22, 12] can detect them at last. Therefore, an adversary can leak
the information stored in the compromised nodes but cannot use the compromised nodes
for further attacks such as packet injection and routing disruption.
2.3. Problem Definition
Problem 1. How can we ensure the location privacy of a sensor network against a global
eavesdropper?
Definition 1. Location privacy is a security property that can be fully satisfied when an
adversary cannot determine the location of a target node with a probability larger than 1/N
where N is the number of nodes in the network.
Definition 2. A global eavesdropper is an adversary who can monitor all traffic in a sensor
network. When a communication flow exists, the global eavesdropper can estimate the
locations of the source and destination of the communication flow from traffic patterns and
concentration points.
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Researchers propose anti-traffic analysis schemes such as random forwarding [11, 20]
and random delay injection [2, 8, 5] to prevent traffic pattern analyses. Some schemes also
use dummy communication flows [6] to make traffic pattern analysis much harder.
Even if anti-traffic analysis schemes and dummy flows are used, the global adversary
can still guess the source and destination from traffic concentration points. In general
sensor networks, almost all the traffic goes to the sink node. Thus, nodes near the sink
node send more messages than other nodes. Moreover, some sensor nodes tend to send
more messages than other nodes due to unbalanced event occurrence in the sensor network
area. Therefore, communication flows should be carefully scheduled to eliminate traffic
concentration points.
Uniform scheduling is a simple method to eliminate traffic concentration points and
take advantages of random forwarding, delay injection, and dummy flows.
Definition 3. A uniformly scheduled sensor network with encryption is a network that in
a designated period, every node of the network transmits the same number of encrypted
messages.
Remark 1. A uniformly scheduled sensor network with encryption can preserve location
privacy against global eavesdroppers.
A global eavesdropper can estimate the locations of its targets from correlations be-
tween specific message deliveries and traffic concentration points. In a uniformly scheduled
sensor network, however, an eavesdropper cannot capture specific traffic correlations, be-
cause the traffic patterns of the uniformly scheduled sensor network are always similar.
Moreover, uniform scheduling can eliminate traffic concentration points. When a sensor
network is uniformly scheduled, an adversary cannot obtain any advantage from global
eavesdropping. As a result, Problem 1 can be solved if we suggest a uniformly scheduled
sensor network with encryption.
Problem 2. How can we ensure location privacy of a sensor network against leaked
information form compromised nodes?
Definition 4. A compromised node is a sensor node that is captured and analyzed by an
adversary. This node can provide hints to the adversary about the location of other nodes.
In most routing protocols for sensor networks, every sensor node has routing infor-
mation to efficiently forward messages to destinations. This routing information can be
used as a hint to estimate the location of the destinations. Thus, to protect location privacy
against leaked information from compromised nodes, we need to eliminate or reduce the
routing information of each node.
Remark 2. When every sensor node of a sensor network has no or limited routing infor-
mation, an adversary cannot obtain sufficient location information from a compromised
node.
Having no or limited routing information implies that each node can only identify
communications in its local area. Even if an adversary compromises a node, he cannot
know the source and destination of communication flows if the node is not near to the
source or destination. Therefore, random selection is the best strategy for the adversary.
The probability that a randomly selected node nears to the target is less than or equal to
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8/N in our network model. Because N is large, the probability is negligible. An adversary
cannot obtain sufficient location information from a compromised node. Consequently,
Problem 2 can be solved when we use a routing protocol that does not require each node
to maintain routing information.
We have to solve Problems 1 and 2 to provide location privacy in sensor networks. A
possible solution for both problems is a constant-rate broadcast scheme. If every sensor
node constantly broadcasts its real or dummy messages to the entire sensor network, (1) no
traffic correlations and no traffic concentration points exist in the sensor network and (2)
each sensor node is not required to maintain routing information. However, the constant-
rate broadcast scheme may generate too much traffic. As a result, our goal is to suggest a
scheme that is just as secure as the constant-rate broadcast scheme while generating less
traffic.
3. Proposed Scheme
3.1. Constant-rate Broadcast
In this section, we propose a constant-rate broadcast (or flooding) scheme for ensuring
location privacy against global eavesdroppers and compromised nodes. Constant-rate trans-
missions can eliminate traffic concentration points from sensor networks and broadcast-
based routing can deliver messages from sensor nodes to a sink node without providing
hints about the location of the sink node. We can preserve the location privacy of sensor
networks when we can guarantee these two properties.
The basic idea of the proposed scheme is having each sensor node to periodically
broadcast a same-size single message that is either real, dummy, or control messages. First,
a sensor node sends a real message if it gathers some sensing data or receives real messages
from its neighbors in the previous periods. Second, a node sends a dummy message for
avoiding traffic analysis attacks if it gathers no data or receives no real message from
its neighbors in the previous periods. Third, a node sends a control message including
its neighbor information or an updated one-hop cluster key if its neighbors seem to be
deactivated or when a one-hop cluster key needs to be changed. Each node appends padding
to its messages for generating same-size messages and then encrypts them with a cluster
key if they are real or dummy messages, or pair-wise shared keys if they are control
messages.
Each node needs to handle messages from its neighbors during message sending
intervals. If it receives a real message, it decrypts the message and then checks whether the
message is new. It only stores new messages and its sensing data to the sending buffer. If it
receives a control message, it updates neighbor information or the cluster key. Otherwise,
it simply discards the message.
When a sensor node is scheduled to broadcast a message, it has to inspect its sending
buffer to compose the message. If the buffer is not empty, it pops data from the buffer,
generates a real message with the data, and then broadcasts the message to its neighbors.
If the buffer is empty, it generates a dummy or control message and then broadcasts the
message to its neighbors.
Transmission Schedule. The proposed scheme demand careful transmission scheduling
to avoid signal collisions due to periodic message broadcast, so we assign different time
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Fig. 1: Transmission schedule when transmission range is 1 cell and interference range is 6 cells
centered at cell 0
slots to each cell to avoid collisions. When a node’s transmission range is t cells from
itself and its interference range is i cells from itself, we assign different time slots for
each of (t+ i+ 1)2 cells. For instance, if a node’s transmission range is one cell and its
interference ranges are six cells, then each of the 64 cells has a different time slot from 0 to
63 (Figure 1). In this case, when the sending rate is a second, each node has 1/64 seconds
to broadcast a message in every second.
Dead Node Revocation. The proposed scheme has to revoke dead nodes that do not
broadcast messages for a long time period (e.g., broken or battery-exhausted nodes) to
maintain the network structure. If a sensor node detects dead neighbor nodes, it simply
removes those nodes from its neighbor list and then updates a cluster key to revoke the
dead nodes. We also treat an attested compromised node as a dead node to exclude it from
the network.
3.2. Forwarder-driven Broadcast (FdB)
We have to solve the main problem of the constant-rate broadcast: it generates many
redundant messages which can overflow the entire sensor networks. A reputable solution
to reduce the number of redundant messages is the multipoint relaying (MPR)-based
broadcast scheme [21]. In MPR-based broadcast scheme, a sender node selects a small
number of relay nodes that can cover all the two-hop neighbors of the sender nodes. When
the sender node broadcasts messages, only the selected relay nodes re-broadcast those
messages to their neighbor nodes, which can ensure two-hop delivery of every message
with minimal redundancy.
Although MPR-based broadcast scheme works well with constant-rate broadcast when
a small number of senders exist, its performance decreases substantially as the number of
senders increases. This performance degradation is due to the bottleneck relay nodes that
122 Sangho Lee et al.
Input: a set No of one-hop neighbors of the node which runs this algorithm;
sets Nis of one-hop neighbors of nodes ni in No
Output: a selected source set S
1 S ← ∅;
2 C ← ∅;
3 foreach ni ∈ No do
4 Io,i ← No ∩Ni;
5 Do,i ← No −Ni;
6 put ni in S;
7 foreach nj ∈ Io,i do
8 Dj,i ← Nj −Ni;
9 if |Do,i| ≤ |Dj,i| then
10 remove ni from S;
11 put ni in C;
12 break;
13 end
14 end
15 end
16 if |S| < |No|/2 and |C| 6= 0 then
17 foreach ni ∈ C do
18 if ni is a diagonal neighbor then
19 remove ni from C;
20 put ni in S;
21 if |S| ≥ |No|/2 then break;
22 end
23 end
24 end
25 while |S| < |No|/2 and |C| 6= 0 do
26 remove a random ni from C;
27 put ni in S;
28 end
29 return S
Fig. 2: Source selection algorithm
have many neighbors and, hence, are repeatedly selected by several senders. This bottleneck
is a serious hindrance to our scheme, because even relay nodes can only send a single
message for each period. This problem can be solved if senders arrive at a consensus when
selecting relay nodes. But, this requires a more complex relay node selection algorithm
and two-hop communications between senders.
We propose a forwarder-driven broadcast (FdB) scheme for solving the preceding
bottleneck problem, which allows each forwarding (or relaying) node to select source
nodes from its neighbors and relay messages only from the chosen nodes. Forwarding
nodes have to carefully select source nodes to reduce communication costs while preserving
network connectivity. For example, if a forwarding node selects all of its neighbors as
sources, the communication cost is the same as that of the simple flooding. On the other
hand, if a forwarding node selects a few source nodes, network connectivity may be broken.
We propose a source selection algorithm for forwarding nodes to preserve network
connectivity with a small number of source nodes (Figure 2). Let us explain the proposed
algorithm with the examples in Figure 3. In these examples, a forwarding node f tries to
select some of its one-hop neighbors n1, n2, . . . , n8 as source nodes. For each candidate
source node c in {n1, . . . , n8}, f compares its advantage over the shared neighbors h
between itself and c. The advantage comes up with the number of the unshared neighbors
that are neighbors of f but not neighbors of c. A large number of unshared neighbors
means that f has an opportunity to forward messages from c to a large number of the nodes
that cannot directly receive messages from c. f decides whether it has to forward messages
from c by comparing the number of the unshared neighbors between itself and c, and
between h and c. In Example 1, for c = n1 and h = {n2, n4}, f chooses n1 as its source
node, because the number of unshared neighbors between n1 and f (5) is larger than the
number of unshared neighbors between n1 and {n2, n4} (both are 3). In Example 2, for
c = n2 and h = {n1, n3, n4, n5}, f does not choose n2 is its source nodes, because the
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Example 1. The forwarding node f selects a candidate source 
node n1 as its source node because the number of unshared 
neighbors between n1 and f (5) is larger than that of between n1 
and {n2,n4} (3). 
Example 2. f will not selects a candidate source node n2 as its 
source node because the number of unshared neighbors between 
n1 and {n4,n5} (5) is larger than that of between n1 and f (3). 
Fig. 3: Source selection examples
number of unshared neighbors between n2 and a subset of h, {n4, n5} (both are 5) are
larger than the number of unshared neighbors between n2 and f (3).
3.3. Security Analysis
Security against Global Eavesdroppers. The proposed scheme can ensure the location
privacy against global eavesdroppers, because all nodes perform almost the same operations.
In wireless networks, a global eavesdropper can ascertain which nodes send messages,
their sending rate, and the number of messages. An adversary can estimate the location
of a source node from such information, as the source node may send more messages at
a higher rate than other nodes. Furthermore, an adversary can estimate the location of a
sink node, because the neighbors of the sink node tend to send more messages than other
nodes to deliver messages to the sink node. In contrast, the proposed scheme makes every
node to send the same number of encrypted real or dummy messages at a constant rate.
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Therefore, the global eavesdropper cannot determine the source or sink nodes from the
number and rate of messages.
Security against Compromised Nodes. The proposed scheme can assure the location
privacy against compromised nodes, because each node maintains the minimum routing
information. In the proposed scheme, a sensor node does not know the location of the
sink node, so it has to broadcast a real message to an entire sensor network. As a result,
even if adversaries compromise a sensor node, they can only obtain the compromised
node’s local information such as the information about the neighbor nodes and whether
a receiving message is real or dummy. We also assume that other nodes can detect a
compromised node using remote attestation [23, 22, 12] and update their cluster keys to
revoke the compromised node. After the revocation, the adversaries cannot obtain any new
information from the sensor networks. They have to use the old information or compromise
other nodes to obtain new information for detecting source or sink nodes. Consequently,
compromised nodes only give limited advantages to adversaries.
3.4. Event Rate and Buffer Size
In this section, we conduct mathematical analyses to obtain the upper bound of event rates
and buffer size for determining the proper message sending rate and buffer size.
Message Delivery Time. We first estimate the worst-case message delivery time to obtain
the upper bound of the message sending rate. When the maximum number of messages
that has to be forwarded is F and the maximum number of hops for each message to
be forwarded is h, the message delivery can be estimated as a h-stage pipeline with F
instructions due to multi-hop store-and-forward communications of sensor networks. Thus,
the message delivery interval is h+ (F − 1). In an N ×N grid (N ≥ 3), when some of
the outermost 4(N − 1) nodes have real messages, they have to send their messages up
to N − 1 hop away nodes, because they do not know where a sink node is. Some of next
4(N − 3) nodes that have real messages also need to send their messages up to N − 2 hop
away nodes and so on (Figure 4). Therefore,
h =

1
N2
(∑N−1
2
i=1 4(N + 1− 2i)(N − i) +
N − 1
2
)
,
where N is odd.
1
N2
∑N
2
i=1 4(N + 1− 2i)(N − i),
where N is even.
(1)
In the simple flooding, F is the same as the number of sensor nodes N2. F is also N2
in MPR-based broadcast, because some bottleneck nodes need to re-broadcast all messages.
In FdB, in contrast, F is
⌈
N2/2
⌉
, since each forwarding nodes need to re-broadcast the
half of all messages. For instance, when N2 = 81 the worst case message delivery interval
of the simple flooding and MPR-based broadcast is about 87.96 and FdB is about 47.96.
As a result, when each node sends a message every second, it can send a real message
every 48 s in FdB.
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Fig. 4: Example of N × N grid topology to analyze message delivery time
Peak Buffer Usage. We estimate the peak buffer usage of the central node that requires a
larger buffer than any other node. We also assume that every node generates a message to
maximize buffer usage.
In the first period, the central node receives and store s messages generated by its
one-hop source neighbors while broadcasting its own message (s may be eight in the
simple flooding and MPR-based broadcast in worst case, and four in FdB.) Thus, the peak
buffer usage is s+ 1.
In the next s periods, the central node receives s2 messages from its source neighbors.
Among the s2 messages, the central node only stores the 2s messages from the two-
hop away nodes, because the other s2 − 2s messages are useless (redundant or dummy
messages). The peak buffer usage depends on how the 2s messages are delivered to the
central node. If they are delivered in advance of all the useless messages, the buffer usage
instantly increases to 2s+ s− 2, because s is already in the buffer and at least two periods
are required to receive 2s messages from s source neighbors. Thus, two messages can be
forwarded out. If they are delivered after the useless messages, however, the buffer usage
increases to 2s, since s messages can be forwarded out.
In the next 2s periods, similarly, the central node receives 2s2 messages and store
the 3s messages from the 3-hop away nodes while forwarding 2s messages. In the worst
case, the buffer usage instantly increases to 3s+ 2s− 3. In the best case, the buffer usage
increases to 3s.
The buffer usage keeps increasing until the central node receives s bN/2c messages
generated by bN/2c-hop away source nodes. In that time, the buffer usage instantly
increases to s bN/2c+ s(bN/2c − 1)− bN/2c in the worst case and s bN/2c in the best
case. On average, the peak buffer usage is
1
2
(
(3s− 1)
⌊
N
2
⌋
− s
)
. (2)
For instance, when N2 = 81 the peak buffer usage of the simple flooding and MPR-based
broadcast is 52 and that of FdB is 24 in the worst case, and 42 and 20 in the average case,
respectively. The peak buffer usage linearly depends on the square root of the number of
nodes. This implies that its scalability is higher than the message delivery time.
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Fig. 5: Comparison on the effect of the number of real senders on the average message delivery time
4. Evaluation
4.1. Simulation Environments
We simulate the proposed scheme using the NS-2 simulator version 2.33. The simulation
areas are 90×90 m and 250×250 m. We randomly deploy 81 and 625 nodes to 10×10 m
cells of the two simulation areas, respectively. Each node’s transmission range is 29 m to
ensure direct message broadcast to eight neighbor cells (diagonal cells need 20
√
2 ≈ 29.)
The interference range is 60 m; thus, message broadcasts can interfere with cells six-
hops away. For each second, each node is scheduled to broadcast one message within
1/64 seconds; their transmission schedule is as in Section 3.1.
4.2. Message Delivery Time
We estimate the message delivery time of the simple flooding, MPR-based broadcast,
and FdB schemes. In the simulation, each of the randomly selected nodes broadcasts a
real message to entire networks. First, we measure the average message delivery time.
Simulation results show that the average message delivery time linearly depends on the
number of real senders. Furthermore, the average message delivery time of FdB is almost
half of that of the simple flooding and MPR-based broadcast schemes (Figure 5).
Next, we check the worst-case message deliver time that is the time when the message
propagation ratio reaches to 100%. The results show that the worst-case message delivery
time of FdB is about half of that of the simple flooding and MPR-based broadcast schemes.
Moreover, the worst-case message delivery time does not exceed the mathematically
analyzed upper bound of the message delivery time (Figure 6).
From the simulation results, we verify that the message delivery of FdB is twice faster
than those of the simple flooding and MPR-based broadcast schemes, so FdB is more
suitable to the environments where sensing events are time critical. We also confirm that the
message delivery time of MPR-based broadcast is almost the same as the simple flooding
in constant-rate broadcast due to the bottleneck relay nodes selected by several sender
nodes (Figures 5 and 6).
Preserving Source- and Sink-location Privacy in Sensor Networks 127
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 0  15  30  45  60  75  90
P
r o
p
a g
a t
i o
n
 r
a t
i o
 (
%
)
Time (s)
8 senders
20 senders
40 senders
60 senders
81 senders
(a) Flooding
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 0  15  30  45  60  75  90
P
r o
p
a g
a t
i o
n
 r
a t
i o
 (
%
)
Time (s)
8 senders
20 senders
40 senders
60 senders
81 senders
(b) MPR-based broadcast
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 0  15  30  45  60  75  90
P
r o
p
a g
a t
i o
n
 r
a t
i o
 (
%
)
Time (s)
8 senders
20 senders
40 senders
60 senders
81 senders
(c) Forwarder-driven broadcast
Fig. 6: Comparison on the effect of the number of real senders on the worst case message time that
is the time when messages are delivered to all nodes (in 81 nodes). Each × mark represents the
mathematically analyzed upper bound of the message delivery time
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Fig. 7: Comparison on the effect of the number of real senders on the peak buffer usage
4.3. Peak Buffer Usage
We check the peak buffer usage of the simple flooding, MPR-based broadcast, and FdB
schemes. Simulation results show that the FdB needs a smaller buffer than those of the
simple flooding and MPR-based broadcast schemes (Figure 7). Therefore, we verify that
the storage cost of FdB is smaller than the simple flooding and MPR-based broadcast
schemes. MPR-based broadcast requires a smaller buffer than the simple flooding but it
requires a larger buffer than the FdB due to the bottleneck relay nodes. In Section 3.4,
we mathematically analyze peak buffer usages and derive Equation 2. In 81 nodes, the
analyzed upper bound is 42 for flooding and MPR-based broadcast, and 20 for FdB. In
625 nodes, the analyzed upper bound is 134 for flooding and MPR-based broadcast, and
64 for FdB. As a consequence, we confirm that the simulated peak buffer usage do not
exceed the mathematically analyzed peak buffer usages.
4.4. Bottleneck Relay Node
We compare the CDF of the number of source neighbors of each sensor node in 81 nodes
to examine the existence of bottleneck relay nodes (Figure 8). In simple flooding, 95.1%
of sensor nodes have to relay real messages from more than four neighbors. In MPR-based
broadcast, 29.6% of sensor nodes have to relay messages from more than five neighbors.
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This bottleneck is due to the 39.5% of sensor nodes that do not relay any real message. On
the other hand, in FdB, all sensor nodes have to relay messages from less than or equal to
four neighbors. FdB has no bottleneck, so its message delivery time and buffer usage are
definitely better than the simple flooding and MPR-based broadcast.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a constant-rate broadcast scheme for ensuring location privacy
against global eavesdroppers and leaked information from compromised nodes in sensor
networks. The proposed scheme makes each node to broadcast real or dummy messages at
a constant rate, so a global eavesdropper cannot determine traffic correlations and traffic
concentration points. Furthermore, an adversary cannot obtain location information on
other nodes from compromised nodes, because each node does not know where other nodes
are. We also proposed a forwarder-driven broadcast (FdB) scheme for efficient concurrent
broadcasts. Mathematical analyses and simulation results showed that FdB was better than
the simple flooding in terms of message delivery time and buffer requirements.
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